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Getting Results Under Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act
Heralded as the most important section' of the Voting Rights Act,2 sec-
tion 5' has nevertheless failed to achieve its potential in eliminating racial
vote dilution. Section 5 does provide unique procedural protection to those
minority voters most likely to suffer from vote dilution. But under the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act, courts must apply a less strin-
gent substantive standard in section 5 cases than in cases arising under
other sections of the Act.
The Voting Rights Act has three key sections: 2, 4, and 5. Section 2"
protects the voting rights of racial minorities throughout the country,
while sections 45 and 5 offer additional special protection in those jurisdic-
tions where racial minorities have historically suffered invidious
discrimination.
Section 2 received much attention in the years following the Supreme
Court's decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden,' which for the first time
clearly required plaintiffs in racial vote dilution cases to prove discrimina-
tory intent,7 and thereby greatly increased the difficulty of proving dilu-
tion. After City of Mobile, the civil rights community centered its efforts
on amending the Voting Rights Act to make the test for racial vote dilu-
tion a results test, not an intent test.8 They succeeded, thus eliminating a
1. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1975) (section 5 largely responsible
for gains achieved in minority political participation), cited in McCain v. Lybrand, 104 S. Ct. 1037,
1045 (1984); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGTS Acr: TaN YEARs AFTrER 329,
345 (1975) [hereinafter cited as TEN YEARs AFTER] (section 5 the "centerpiece" and "cornerstone" of
Voting Rights Act); McDonald, The 1982 Extension of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965:
The Continued Need for Preclearance, 51 TENN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1983).
2. The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, amending the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1982)).
3. Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(1982)).
4. Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973
(1982)).
5. Section 4 sets forth the criteria-a history of racial discrimination and low minority voter turn-
out-that determine which jurisdictions must preclear voting changes under § 5. Pub. L. No. 89-110,
§ 4, 79 Stat. 437, 438-39 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1982)).
6. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion).
7. Id. at 60-61, 69-73.
8. 128 CONG. Rc. H3845 (daily ed. June 23, 1982) (statement of Rep. Butler) ("The principle
[sic] area of disagreement during Senate debate of the act was . . . the question of intent versus
effect."); see also Parker, The "Results" Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act- Abandoning the
Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. REV. 715, 716-17 n.1 1 (1983) (three months of Senate hearings "focused
almost exclusively on the § 2 amendment").
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major obstacle-proving discriminatory intent-that had prevented minor-
ity voters from successfully challenging discriminatory election procedures.
Congress and lobbyists paid less attention, however, to the tests of sec-
tion 5, which had always explicitly prohibited standards, practices, or pro-
cedures that were discriminatory either in purpose or in effect." Yet the
particular effects test that the Supreme Court created for use under sec-
tion 5-the retrogression test-sometimes provides less protection to racial
minorities in these specially protected jurisdictions than does the effects
test Congress provided for section 2-the results test.10 Because section 5
cases come to the courts via a unique procedural route, courts have not
been able to apply section 2 to these cases. Thus, paradoxically, under the
Supreme Court's interpretation of section 5, courts apply a less stringent
effects test in precisely those jurisdictions where Congress intended to pro-
vide special protection.
This Note argues that courts should apply the more stringent results
test of amended section 2 to section 5 as well. To do so would be in keep-
ing with the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act and with the
Constitution, and would make the amended provisions of the Act operate
together more efficiently and coherently.
I. Two TESTS FOR RACIAL VOTE DILUTION
A. Section 5 and the Retrogression Test
Section 5 embodies an extraordinary grant of federal authority. Under
section 5, jurisdictions with a history of racial discrimination and low mi-
nority voter participation are required to preclear all proposed changes in
9. Section 5 provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a State or political subdivision [covered under section 4] . . . shall enact or seek to
administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or proce-
dure with respect to voting [hereinafter voting change] different from that in force or effect on
[applicable date of comparison] . . . such State or subdivision may institute an action in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such
[voting change] does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in §
1973b of this title [section 4(f)(2), protecting certain language minorities from denial or
abridgment of their right to vote], and unless and until the court enters such judgment no
person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such [voting change]: Pro-
vided, That such [voting change] has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appro-
priate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General
has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission. . . . Neither an af-
firmative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made, nor the Attorney
General's failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a
subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such [voting change]. . . . Any action under this
section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provi-
sions of section 2284 of Title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982).
10. The retrogression test looks for a diminution of preexisting minority voting strength, whereas
the results test looks for social and institutional factors typical of racial vote dilution.
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voting laws or procedures with the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia or with the United States Attorney General. If the
proposed changes "have the purpose [or will] .. have the effect of deny-
ing or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color [or language
minority status]"," then preclearance must be denied.
Congress had never before required cities, counties, and other state and
local governments to submit new laws and procedures to the federal gov-
ernment for approval. But as the Supreme Court noted in upholding the
constitutionality of section 5, this "uncommon exercise"' 2 of federal au-
thority was essential to the success of the Voting Rights Act: States had
shown ingenuity in devising new vote dilution strategies;' 3 the Depart-
ment of Justice could not singlehandedly monitor voting changes through-
out the country; and private suits would not adequately supplement
federal enforcement resources.'
4
In a series of cases beginning with Allen v. State Board of Elections,5
the Supreme Court held that section 5 applied not only to tests or devices
that could deny minority voters the opportunity to cast a ballot, but also to
electoral structures that could dilute the strength of minority votes.' This
interpretation of the scope of section 5 was critical to minority voters'
hopes of becoming full participants in the electoral process. For example,
in a city with an at-large electoral system' 7 and racially-polarized vot-
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982). Typically, jurisdictions submit proposed changes first to the De-
partment of Justice, which has 60 days to make the preclearance decision or to request additional
information. Minority voters may not appeal a decision of the Attorney General to preclear a voting
change, but may go to court to challenge the enacted practice under § 2. The submitting jurisdiction
may appeal a denial of preclearance, however, by filing for a declaratory judgment in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia. See 28 C.F.R. § 51 (1983).
12. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966).
13. See id. at 335.
14. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 396 (1971).
15. 393 U.S. 544, 566-70 (1969) (right to vote must be given "broadest possible scope," and
requires preclearance of changes that may dilute votes, such as changes from district election system to
at-large system or from elective to appointive system); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 388-89
(1971) (annexation plans subject to preclearance); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 534-35
(1973) (reapportionment plans subject to preclearance); cf. S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
16-17, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 774, 782-83 ("As registration and voting
of minority citizens increases, other measures may be resorted to which would dilute increasing mi-
nority voting strength . . . includling] switching to at-large elections, annexations of predominantly
white areas, or the adoption of discriminatory redistricting plans .... ").
16, See generally TEN YEARs A-rER, supra note 1, at 204-327 (surveying techniques and in-
stances of racial vote dilution); Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L.
REV. 523, 552-60 (1973).
17. Under an at-large system, voters cast ballots not for a representative for their district but for
all contested seats. The votes of any particular geographical area are thereby submerged in the votes
of the entire polity, increasing the likelihood that only candidates favored by the majority will be
elected. See Berry & Dye, The Discriminatory Effects of At-Large Elections, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 85
(1979) (discussing dilutive effects of at-large systems); Bonapfel, Minority Challenges to At-Large
Elections: The Dilution Problem, 10 GA. L. REv. 353 (1976) (same).
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ing, 8 blacks might number a third or more of the population but never
succeed in electing a candidate of their choice,19 nor in exerting political
influence in other ways, such as forming coalitions with white voters to
lobby for common goals.20 Providing racial minorities an equal opportu-
nity to participate in the electoral process not only benefits minority
groups,21 but also contributes to the stability and legitimacy of the politi-
cal system,22 and has been a consistent goal of Congress at least since the
original enactment of the Voting Rights Act in 1965.23
The effects test of section 5-the retrogression test-was first set forth
in Beer v. United States.24 The Court there construed section 5 to prohibit
only those changes that would have a retrogressive effect on preexisting
minority voting strength, that is, an effect that reduced the ability of mi-
nority voters to elect candidates of their choice. 25 The Court's construction
in Beer thus did not prohibit changes that merely "ameliorated" without
fully remedying existing minority vote dilution.26 Though ostensibly de-
18. Voting is racially polarized when voters vote primarily for candidates of their own race.
19. See Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 461 F. Supp. 1282, 1288-89 (S.D. Miss. 1978), aff'd, 714
F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1983).
20. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982) (racial bloc voting "allows those elected
to ignore black interests without fear of political consequences"); Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, 5 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 107, 152 (1976) ("[S]tructural limitations on the political power of
blacks still persist. .. IT]hey are a numerical minority . . . the perpetual underclass. . . land] the
object of 'prejudice'. .. [making] it particularly difficult for them to form coalitions with others [and]
advantageous for the dominant political parties to hurt them. . . ."); Howard & Howard, The
Dilemma of the Voting Rights Act-Recognizing the Emerging Political Equality Norn, 83 COLUM.
L. REv. 1615, 1630 (1983) ("blacks differ fundamentally from other political minorities," and are
alienated, and face attempts to exclude them "from political participation and coalition building").
21. See Howard & Howard, supra note 20, at 1630-31 (equal opportunity decreases alienation
and increases participation); Note, The Constitutional Signficance of the Discriminatory Effects of At-
Large Elections, 91 YALE L.J. 974, 988 (1982) (benefits include voice in decisionmaking; decrease in
"discriminatory rhetoric"; new role models for minority group members; increased "minority pride,
political consciousness, participation, and identification with the government").
22. See J.S. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 146 (1st ed. London
1861) ("It is an essential part of democracy that minorities should be adequately represented."); Hart-
man, Racial Vote Dilution and Separation of Powers: An Exploration of the Conflict Between the
Judicial "Intent" and the Legislative "Results" Standards, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 689, 738 n.311
(1982).
23. See infra note 119 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Congressional efforts to im-
prove black electoral participation before 1965, see McDonald, supra note 1, at 15-25.
24. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
25. For example, if a city whose at-large elections are marked by racially polarized voting an-
nexes a large, all-white suburb, this annexation reduces the number of black voters as a percentage of
all municipal voters, and thereby diminishes the influence of black voters on city elections.
The Court also noted in Beer that changes which were not retrogressive might still violate § 5 if the
changes were so discriminatory as to violate the Constitution. 425 U.S. at 141. This comment led the
lower courts, commentators, and Congress to conclude that the test under § 5 was two-pronged, one
for retrogressive effects, the other for constitutional violations. Motomura, Preclearance Under Section
Five of the Voting Rights Act, 61 N.C.L. REv. 189, 194 (1983).
26. The logic behind the retrogression test in Beer might have been that, by allowing preclearance
of changes that "ameliorated" minority voting strength, but did not provide a full remedy, the test
would encourage jurisdictions to make ameliorative changes. 425 U.S. at 141. But when the changes a
jurisdiction submits are obligatory rather than optional, such as reapportioning districts to conform to
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
rived from the legislative history of the 1975 Voting Rights Act Amend-
ments,2 7 the retrogression test was in fact the Supreme Court's highly in-
terpretive creation.28 In establishing existing minority voting strength as
the benchmark against which to measure claims of racial vote dilution, the
Court laid the foundation for the central inconsistency in the Act-a
change can be precleared under section 5 even though it would violate the
results test of section 2.
The retrogression standard was reaffirmed and expanded in City of
Lockhart v. United States.20 Here the Court acknowledged that the ex-
isting municipal voting procedures in Lockhart, Texas might discriminate
against black residents, and noted that the new procedures proposed by
the city30 would not ameliorate, but might actually perpetuate, that dis-
crimination.31 The Court nevertheless upheld the procedures because they
were not retrogressive-they would not exacerbate vote dilution in Lock-
hart. 2 The Court's decision in Lockhart illustrates that, when the retro-
the one person, one vote requirement of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), this rationale does
not apply. As for optional changes, one could argue consistent with Beer that an ameliorative change
is better than no change at all, and should therefore be precleared. This argument, while not without
some force, overlooks the substantial opportunity to achieve real progress that a denial of preclearance
to such changes creates. Jurisdictions that greatly desire to implement their proposed optional changes
may well choose to eliminate minority vote dilution in order to do so. And in jurisdictions that decide
to drop the proposed changes, the denial of preclearance will put minority voters on notice that a
challenge to the existing electoral system under § 2 may well succeed.
The inconsistency of the retrogression test with the basic goals of the Act became more distinct
when the Court expanded the retrogression test in City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125
(1983), to allow preclearance of changes that perpetuate, rather than ameliorate, vote dilution. The
argument supporting ameliorative optional changes does not, of course, apply to changes that perpetu-
ate racial vote dilution, since those changes make no progress whatsoever toward the Act's goals.
27. See Beer, 425 U.S. at 141 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1975)).
28. A passage in the House Report on the 1975 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act that was
the source of the retrogression test criticized the Attorney General for focusing narrowly on the ad-
ministration of preclearance, and stated that:
the standard [for § 5] can only be fully satisfied by determining . . . whether the ability of
minority groups to participate in the political process and to elect their choices to office is
augmented, diminished, or not affected by the change affecting voting in view of the political,
sociological, economic, and psychological circumstances within the community proposing the
change.
H.R. REP. No. 196, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 60 (1975) (emphasis added). If any test were to be derived
from this passage, the results test, with its emphasis on the totality of circumstances, would be most
consistent with the language emphasized above. See infra pp. 144-46 (describing results test). And as
Justice Marshall has pointed out, nothing in this passage suggests that only changes which diminish
the voting strength of minorities are to be denied preclearance. City of Lockhart v. United States, 460
U.S. 125, 144-45 (1983) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29. 460 U.S. 125 (1983). In reversing the lower court, the Court made no mention of the constitu-
tional prong that many had inferred from Beer, see supra note 25, but did apply the retrogression
principle of Beer. Id. at 134 ("'Although the new plan may have remained discriminatory, it never-
theless was not a regressive change. . . . Since the new plan did not increase the degree of discrimina-
tion against blacks, it was entitled to § 5 preclearance.' ") (quoting Beer, 425 U.S. at 138).
30. See infra note 61.
31. 460 U.S. at 133-36.
32. Id. ("Although there may have been no improvement in the[ I voting strength [of Lockhart's
minorities], there has been no retrogression either.").
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gression test is applied, section 5 will not protect minority voters from
changes that perpetuate vote dilution."3
B. Section 2 and the Results Test
Section 2 allows citizens in any political subdivision in the country to
challenge existing voting practices.3 The original language of section 2
did not state whether courts were to apply a purpose or an effects test.3 5
In White v. Regester,8 the Court appeared to adopt an effects test that
looked to the presence of certain factors indicative of racial vote dilution. 7
Codified by the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen,38 these factors
were the standard measure of racial vote dilution (except in section 5
cases) until 1980,"1 when a plurality of the Supreme Court in City of
Mobile v. Bolden4" reversed a finding of racial vote dilution based on the
Zimmer factors, and held that both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments as well as section 2 required plaintiffs to prove intent.41
The difficulty of successfully proving intent42 and the undesirability of
33. The courts cannot directly apply § 2 in these cases. Under the preclearance procedure pre-
scribed for § 5, both the Department of Justice and the district court limit their review to issues raised
under § 5.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
35. Section 2 originally spoke only of preventing practices that "deny or abridge the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color." Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437,
437 (1965).
36. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
37. Id. at 766-69 (discussing "totality of circumstances" that supported district court's invalida-
tion of multimember districts in two Texas counties).
38. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), af'd on other grounds sub norn. East Carroll
Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). The Zimmer factors include:
a lack of access to the process of slating candidates, the unresponsiveness of legislators to their
particularized interests, a tenuous state policy underlying the preference for multi-member or
at-large districting . . . past discrimination . . . large districts, majority vote requirements,
anti-single shot voting provisions and the lack of provision for at-large candidates running
from particular geographical subdistricts.
Id. at 1305 (footnotes omitted).
39. Even a case holding that plaintiffs needed to show discriminatory purpose also held that a
showing of the Zimmer factors provided sufficient grounds from which to infer the presence of dis-
criminatory purpose. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 217, 222-23 (5th Cir. 1978).
40. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion).
41. Id. at 60-61, 72-73.
42. On the practical difficulty of applying an intent test, see Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613,
642-650 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting); S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-7, reprinted in
1982 U.S. CODE: CONG. & AD. NEws 177, 214-15 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT] (intent test
"asks wrong question . . . is unnecessarily divisive . . . [imposes] an inordinately difficult burden
• . . [and is vulnerable to defendants'] planting a false trail of direct evidence" of neutral purpose);
Blacksher & Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs
Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 42 n.275 (1982) (illustrating diffi-
cult questions that "only begin the tangled inquiry into the meaning of an intent standard of unconsti-
tutional dilution"); Hartman, supra note 22, at 713 (establishing legislative purpose "fraught with
inadequacies"); Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 1163, 1163-66
(1978) (problems inherent in intent test undermine its effectiveness); cf. Ely, The Centrality and
Limits of Motivation Analysis, 15 SAN DiEGo L. REV. 1155, 1160-61 (1983) (inquiry into legislative
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relying exclusively on an intent standard in vote dilution cases,43
prompted Congress to amend section 2 to require plaintiffs to show only
that the challenged electoral practice "results in a denial or abridgment of
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color [or language minority status]." '44 The congressional results test iden-
tifies certain social45 and institutiona4 6  factors47 that, when found to-
purpose inappropriate where constitutional rights involved). But see Blumstein, Defining and Proving
Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act,
69 VA. L. REv. 633, 705-07 (1978) (effects test appropriate only for denials of access to the polls;
intent test should be required to show vote dilution).
43. It is immaterial to minority voters whether election structures that abridge their voting
strength exist as a result of a deliberate plan to dilute minority votes, or are simply the product of
benign purposes which, when placed in a particular social context, result in vote dilution. The antidis-
crimination principle, with its perpetrator perspective, see Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimina-
tion through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L.
REV. 1049, 1052-57 (1978), is of limited usefulness in the voting context because structures such as
at-large voting systems, majority vote requirements and anti-single-shot voting laws serve the interests
of those with political power, and politicians may desire to preserve these structures for non-racist
reasons. In the absence of discriminatory motive, there may still be discriminatory effects. See H.R.
REP. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. 30 (1981) ("Discriminatory election structures can minimize and
cancel out minority voting strength as much as prohibiting minorities from registering and voting.");
Fiss, supra note 20, at 141-43 (basic poverty of antidiscrimination principle stems from its failure to
recognize that "facially innocent criteria" can have discriminatory effects); Howard & Howard, supra
note 20, at 1644 (politicians discriminate against blacks for political as well as racial reasons).
In the case of redistricting, a prisoners' dilemma complicates the problem. Every legislator individu-
ally might agree that a redistricting scheme that was drawn to fairly represent black voting strength is
desirable, but no legislator will want to sacrifice his or her seat to the new plan. Although the actions
are motivated not by racism but by a desire to preserve personal political power, the outcome can be
the inability of blacks to elect representatives of their choice.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982) (emphasis added).
45. The social factors are indicative of the character of the political community and include (1) a
low history of black electoral participation, (2) racially polarized voting, (3) racist campaign appeals,
(4) official racial discrimination, (5) unresponsiveness of government to minority needs, and (6) social,
economic and health effects of past discrimination on the minority community. See SENATE REPORT,
supra note 42, at 28-29.
46. The institutional factors are the community's voting laws and procedures. They include anti-
single-shot rules, majority vote requirements, and at-large elections, id., as well as "other voting prac-
tices or procedures" including residency requirements, numbered posts, and staggered terms, id. at 29,
all of which increase the likelihood that only candidates supported by a majority of voters will win.
For an explanation of these rules, see TEN YEARS AFTER, supra note 1, at 204-10.
47. The courts have considerable discretion in deciding when enough factors have been shown to
establish a claim of racial vote dilution. The Senate Report neither divides the factors into the catego-
ries suggested here, supra notes 45-46, nor suggests that both social and institutional factors are
necessary to sustain a claim of minority vote dilution. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 42, at 28-29.
While courts need flexibility to make local appraisals, courts could develop basic guidelines for
evaluating the significance of a particular aggregate of factors. For example, in most cases both types
of factors ought to be present to support a finding of vote dilution. Such a finding will generally not
be appropriate in a community that has at-large elections or anti-single-shot voting but no history of
discrimination and no racially polarized voting or other significant social factors that could lead those
election procedures to have a discriminatory effect. Similarly, courts are unlikely to find vote dilution
in a community that has a history of discrimination and racially polarized voting but also has a
districting scheme that allows blacks to elect representatives of their choice in numbers roughly pro-
portionate to their percentage of the voting age population. Cf City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,
111 n.7 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The test for unconstitutional vote dilution, then, looks
only to the discriminatory effects of the combination of an electoral structure and historical and social
factors.").
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gether in one community, generally prevent racial minorities from partici-
pating in elections on equal footing with white voters.48 Many of these
factors were part of the Zimmer test.49 By refocusing the courts' attention
on these factors, Congress was apparently trying to distinguish less-than-
proportionate representation due to the normal vicissitudes of politics from
less-than-proportionate representation due to the effective exclusion of mi-
norities from the political arena.50
Thus, unlike the retrogression test of section 5, which measures the im-
pact of a new voting practice on existing minority voting strength, the
results test of amended section 2 looks simply for the presence or absence
of racial vote dilution. The benchmark of the results test is voting strength
roughly proportionate to the size of the minority group. But the test does
not guarantee proportionate representation:5" To show "a mere disparity
between the number of minority residents and the number of minority
representatives""2 is not enough. Rather, the test guarantees equality of
opportunity for minorities to elect candidates of their choice.
The results test is not perfect. As with any test that relies on balancing
numerous factors, the burden of fact-gathering is heavy,53 and the possi-
bility of uneven judicial application of the test is significant.5' But other
48. For example, where there is both racially polarized voting and an at-large election system, the
classic model of majority representation breaks down. The model recognizes no problem of minority
vote dilution because it presupposes that there are no permanent minorities, but only shifting coali-
tions, each modifying and refining its position so as to appeal to new constituents and maximize
political strength. See Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U.
PA. L. REv. 540, 569-71 (1977). In a community marked by racial bloc voting, however, there are by
definition no coalitions which cross racial lines; blacks are relegated to permanent minority status,
while the politicking that matters takes place within the community of white voters. See Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982). With at-large elections and racially polarized voting, a city which is
30% black may exist for decades with no black representation. E.g., Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 461
F. Supp. 1282, 1289 (S.D. Miss. 1978), aff'd, 714 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1983).
49. Compare factors listed supra notes 45 & 46 with those listed supra note 38 (unresponsiveness
of public officials to minority community, although key in Zimmer, is not important to results test).
50. Justice Marshall has phrased the distinction as one between instances of disproportionate
minority representation attributable to racial factors and instances attributable to "mere lack of suc-
cess at the polls." City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 111 n.7 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982) (results test does not create "a right to have members of a protected
class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population"); cf. White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755, 769 (1973) (no constitutional right of racial or political minorities to proportionate representation
in state legislature); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 154-55 (1971) (same).
52. The language quoted is from Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d at 1305; see also SENATE
REPORT, supra note 42, at 30-31 (no right to proportionality in representation); Hartman, supra
note 22, at 739 ("[T]he results test is not satisfied by a simple statistical demonstration that the
number of minority representatives is less than the percentage of minority population."); cf. Them-
strom, Odd Evolution of the Voting Rights Act, 55 PUB. INT. 49, 63 (1979) ("Even the most careful
drawing of ward lines does not guarantee the representation of minorities in proportion to their
size.").
53. Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875, 879 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Perhaps in no other area of the law is
as much specificity in reasoning and fact finding required, as shown by our frequent remands of
voting dilution cases to district courts."), vacated and remanded in light of amended section 2, 460
U.S. 1065 (1983).
54. Compare Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (invalidating at-large elec-
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types of effects tests would be even more flawed in the voting context than
the results test,55 and the results test is sufficiently flexible to allow refine-
ment over time.56 As it stands, the results test is a reasonable way of mea-
suring the social problem that needs measuring: determining when combi-
nations of facially neutral institutional structures (such as at-large voting)
and social factors (such as racial bloc voting) result in political disen-
franchisement of racial minorities.
C. Applying the Results and Retrogression Tests
While many have celebrated the substitution of the results test for
an intent test in section 2,1' the relative merits of the results test and
the retrogression test need further consideration. Although neither
test requires proof of intent, the two are quite different. Examine, for
example, the record in City of Lockhart against the results criteria.
Although 41% of the population of Lockhart, Texas was Mexican-
American,5" only one Mexican-American candidate had ever been
elected mayor or commissioner.59  Lockhart's at-large elections
were characterized by racial bloc voting6" and by rules favoring
the white majority, including anti-single-shot provisions,6 numbered
tions) with Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 461 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D. Miss. 1978) (upholding at-large
elections), afj'd, 714 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1978); cf Note, Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: The
Intent Standard and Equal Protection Law, 92 YALE L.J. 328, 347-49 & n.120 (1982) (revealing
different Supreme Court interpretations of similar vote dilution situations).
55. The test most commonly used for identifying discriminatory effects is a disproportionate im-
pact test, under which actions affecting individual rights are prohibited if they harm the rights and
interests of minorities more than the rights and interests of the majority. See Perry, supra note 48, at
555-62. This test is basic to employment discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (showing of disproportionate impact
of job-screening practices on minority applicants sufficient to invalidate practices unless employer
shows practices to be job-related), and is useful also in litigation concerning discriminatory public
school administration, housing, and land use, see Perry, supra upte 48, at 574-85. This test is too
strict in the voting rights context, however, since it would result in violations whenever a minority
group could show simply a lack of representation proportionate to their percentage of the electorate.
Lack of proportionate representation is inevitable in a majoritarian electoral system, and is not the
problem that the Voting Rights Act seeks to address. The test for racial vote dilution must distinguish
a single instance of minority political failure from the inability of minorities to participate in elections
on an equal basis because of persistent racial discrimination and the use of certain electoral practices.
56. See Note, Geonetry and Geography: Racial Gerrynandering and the Voting Rights Act, 94
YALE L.J. 189, 200-06 (1984) (different interpretation of results test needed to tackle racial gerry-
mandering); Note, supra note 21, at 998 (presence of only three factors-racial bloc voting, at-large
elections, and less-than-proportionate minority representation-should be sufficient to prove discrimi-
natory effect).
57. See Parker, supra note 8.
58. City of Lockhart v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 581, 583 (D.D.C. 1981), rev'd, 460 U.S. 125
(1983).
59. Id. at 584. This occurred because an unusually large number of white candidates split the
white vote. Id. at 585.
60. Id. at 584. The one successful Mexican-American candidate received 655 votes; 660 Mexican-
Americans voted in the election. Id. at 585.
61. Id. at 585. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 42, at 29 (anti-single-shot rule is typical dilution
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posts,62 and staggered terms.6 3 Applying the retrogression test, the Court
held that the district court should have precleared the voting changes6 4
even though they would perpetuate existing vote dilution. 5 Had the
Court used the results test in Lockhart, the presence of so many factors
indicative of racial vote dilution would most likely have led it to affirm the
district court's denial of preclearance. Thus the retrogression test does not
protect minority voters from vote dilution as thoroughly as does the results
test.
In deciding annexation cases, the Court has implicitly abandoned the
retrogression test in favor of criteria similar to those of the section 2 re-
sults test. Cities may annex white suburbs even though the annexations
clearly have a retrogressive effect, 6 as long as the cities agree to abandon
their at-large system in favor of a districting system that would fairly re-
present post-annexation minority voting strength.6" The rationale under-
lying the Court's decisions seems clear: Retrogression does not make sense
in the annexation context. Cities may need to annex white suburbs for
non-racist reasons, even for fiscal reasons that could potentially benefit the
minority population; section 5 should not prevent annexation if minorities
are fairly represented after the change.
The D. C. District Court has also experienced difficulty using the ex-
isting election system as the benchmark in applying the retrogression test.
In cases decided before City of Lockhart, the court relied on the intent test
developed in constitutional vote dilution cases, rather than on the retro-
gression test. In one case, where the election districts were "severely
malapportioned," 6'8 the court used a "fairly drawn"69 plan as a bench-
mark; in another, where the existing election system had never been
precleared, 70 the court required plaintiffs to show that "the proposed
change fairly reflects the strength of black voting power as it exists." 7' In
factor). Anti-single-shot rules require voters to vote for as many candidates as positions, preventing
voters from voting just for one candidate. See City of Rome v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 221, 244
(D.D.C. 1979), affd, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
62. City of Lockhart, 559 F. Supp. at 585.
63. Id.
64. Lockhart proposed two additional seats on the city council, each numbered posts, to be elected
at-large, with staggered terms.
65. City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 135-36 (1983).
66. E.g., City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159 (1982); City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975); City of Peters-
burg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972), affd mere., 410 U.S. 962 (1973).
67. See City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 378.
68. Wilkes County v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1171, 1178 (D.D.C.), aff'd mein., 439 U.S. 999
(1978).
69. Id. at 1176.
70. Mississippi v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 569, 582 (D.D.C. 1979), affd men., 444 U.S.
1050 (1980).
71. Id. at 581.
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these and other cases, the court has abandoned a strict application of the
retrogression test and resorted to a constitutional analysis based on factors
similar to those of the section 2 results test.7 2 Yet these decisions are in-
consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in City of Lockhart. The
courts' difficulties in applying the retrogression test suggest the need to
incorporate the results test of section 2 into section 5.
II. A NEW STANDARD FOR SECTION 5
Courts have yet to decide whether the 1982 amendments have altered
the effects standard under section 5. 7" The Supreme Court explicitly de-
clined to address this issue in Lockhart, preferring to have the district
court consider it first. 4 As the D. C. District Court recently noted:
"'Whether . . . the 'results' standard of Section 2 can properly be im-
ported into Section 5 presents a complex issue which can be decided only
after a comprehensive assessment of the statutory scheme and legislative
history.' "' 1 Part II attempts this assessment.
A. Legislative History
Although as part of the 1982 amendments Congress extended the life of
section 5 for twenty-five years,7 it did not modify section 5's statutory
language. Nevertheless, there is direct evidence that Congress intended the
results test to apply to section 5.
The Senate Judiciary Committee's Report stated: "In light of the
amendment to section 2, it is intended that a section 5 objection also fol-
low if a new voting procedure itself so discriminates as to violate section
72. Both the intent test, used by the courts in cases involving flawed existing systems and/or
annexations, and the results test derive from the same set of constitutional vote dilution factors. See,
e.g., Hale County v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 1206, 1212-18 (D.D.C. 1980) (findings of racial
bloc voting, history of discrimination, and ongoing discriminatory effects); Wilkes County v. United
States, 450 F. Supp. 1171, 1173-76 (D.D.C. 1978) (findings of staggered terms, majority vote and
residency requirements, racial bloc voting, past discrimination, and ongoing discriminatory effects); cf.
Motomura, supra note 25, at 232 (noting "emerging pattern" of reliance on constitutional vote dilu-
tion factors for § 5 analysis in cases preceding City of Lockhart).
73. Cf. Hartman, supra note 22, at 733 n.281 (implications of 1982 amendments for § 5
unresolved).
74. 460 U.S. 133 n.9. Justices Marshall and Blackmun would have directly addressed the issue.
Id. at 147 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("There is no justification for the
Court's refusal to consider the 1982 reenactment of § 5 and amendment of § 2."); id. at 149 (Black-
mun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("At the very least, I would remand the case...
to determine whether the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 . . . have altered the applicable
standard under § 5.").
75. County Council v. United States, 555 F. Supp. 694, 698 (D.D.C. 1983) (quoting from Reply
Brief of the United States in City of Lockhart v. United States). The court ultimately did not reach the
question of the applicability of the results test to § 5, since it held the proposed changes to be retro-
gressive. County Council v. United States, No. 82-0912, slip op. at 9 (D.D.C. May 25, 1984) (per
curiam).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(8) (1982).
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2."'7 While there is no further discussion of the matter in the Senate Re-
port, this single statement is clear78 and is not contradicted by any other
statement in the Report. Moreover, both Senator Kennedy and Represen-
tative Sensenbrenner referred to this passage of the Senate Report during
the floor debates, stating, "[A]s the [Senate] report points out, where there
is a section 5 submission which is not retrogressive, it would be objected to
only if the new practice itself violated the Constitution or amended section
2.''1 9 Senator Kennedy's statement should be accorded considerable
weight, since he was one of the original sponsors of the bill,80 and no
Senator disputed his statement.8"
The House Report on the 1982 Amendments also suggests that
preclearance should not be granted under section 5 to a proposed voting
change that, if enacted, would leave the electoral system still in violation
of section 2: "Under the Voting Rights Act, whether a discriminatory
practice or procedure is of recent origin affects only the mechanism that
triggers relief, i.e., litigation or preclearance. The lawfulness of such a
practice should not vary depending upon when it was adopted, i.e.,
whether it is a change. '8
2
The debate in the House, however, was somewhat more confused than
that in the Senate. Representative Edwards, another sponsor of the bill,
initially concurred with Representative Sensenbrenner's statement that
proposed changes that would violate section 2 should be held to violate
section 5.83 Representatives Fowler and Levitas later elicited a contrary
interpretation from Representative Edwards. After Representative Fowler
inquired whether it was "true that the proposed amendments sent over by
the other body do not change in any way section 5 of the current Voting
Rights Act,' 8 4 Representative Edwards replied "That is correct; the
77. SENATE REPORT, supra note 42, at 12 n.31. Cf McDonald, supra note 1, at 42 & n.248
(relying on footnote 31 of the Senate Report to assert that "[i]n 1982 Congress responded directly to
Beer" by incorporating results test into § 5, but recognizing that Supreme Court has avoided deciding
issue).
78. The wording "violate section 2," as opposed to "violate the results test," has, however, led to
confusion over the burden of proving a results violation under § 5. See discussion infra pp. 156-57.
79. 128 CONG. REC. S7095 (daily ed. June 18, 1982) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); id. at H3841
(daily ed. June 23, 1982) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
80. Cf Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 204 n.24 (1976) (comments of those not
involved in drafting or preparing a bill "are entitled to little weight").
81. See 128 CONG. REC. (daily ed. June 9-18, 1982); SENATE REPORT, supra note 42, at 88-239
(Senators Thurmond, Hatch, Laxalt, Denton, and East did not dispute Sen. Kennedy's statement).
82. H.R. REP. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1981).
83. 128 CONG. REC. H3841 (daily ed. June 23, 1982) (statements of Reps. Sensenbrenner &
Edwards).
84. Id. at H3845 (statement of Rep. Fowler).
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preclearance provisions are not changed.""5 A similar exchange took place
between Representatives Levitas and Edwards."6
It is not surprising that during this lengthy debate over complex is-
sues,"7 Congress did not always speak with one voice. In deciding what
weight to accord this particular colloquy in the House, however, several
factors bear consideration. Representatives Levitas and Fowler posed their
questions indirectly, asking not whether the results test would be applied
under section 5, but simply whether there was any change to section 5.
They may have done so because they had personal interests in this issue
that other Representatives did not share."8 In any case, Representative
Edwards' general responses are the only comments in the record that
could be interpreted as contrary to the direct language of the Senate and
House Reports and of Senator Kennedy and Representative
Sensenbrenner. 9
On balance, then, the direct evidence of legislative intent favors the view
that courts should now apply the results test in section 5. After consider-
ing the legislative history, the Department of Justice also has concluded
that Congress intended the results test to apply to section 5.90 This inter-
85. Id. (statement of Rep. Edwards).
86. Id. at H3844 ((statement of Rep. Levitas) (Is there "any portion of this legislation that
changes section 5?"); (statement of Rep. Edwards) ("No change was made.")).
87. The difficulty of distinguishing "results" from "effects," for example, became evident during
the 1982 hearings on the extension of the Act. Compare Hearings on the Voting Rights Act Extension
Before the Subcomin. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess.
143 (1982) (statement of Archibald Cox), reprinted in SENATE REPORT, supra note 42, at 138 ("If
you mean the effects test as interpreted by the courts with regard to section 5, 1 think that is consider-
ably different from the results test in section 2.") with id. (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner, cosponsor
of bill) ("[W]e are splitting hairs in attempting to see a significant difference in a results test or an
effects test.").
88. During the debate on the Amendments, both Representative Fowler (5th Dist. Ga.) and Rep-
resentative Levitas (4th Dist. Ga.), were undoubtedly aware of a pending § 5 suit involving reappor-
tionment of their congressional districts. See Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982), affd.,
459 U.S. 1166 (1983). One state representative had testified that, if preclearance were denied and the
district lines redrawn to increase black voting strength, both incumbents would lose their seats. 549 F.
Supp. at 508. See also POLrrIcs IN AMERICA: MEMBERS OF CONGRESS IN WASHINGTON AND AT
HOME (A. Ehrenhalt, ed.) 282 (1982) (Rep. Fowler first non-black member of Congress from 4th
District in two decades); Post-Trial Brief of Defendant-Intervenors at 11-13, County Council v.
United States, No. 82-0912 (D.D.C. 1984) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
89. These comments cannot in themselves answer the question of "what was the intent of Con-
gress"-they can at most undermine our confidence that simply reading what Congress said is suffi-
cient to answer the question. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 568-69 (1969) (single
remark not conclusive when interpreting legislative history).
90. Objection letter from Assistant Attorney General W.B. Reynolds to W. Ward, Starkville,
Miss. (June 17, 1983) ("Where, as here, such unlawful conduct results in so clear a discriminatory
impact on a protected minority group, amended Section 2 [of] the Voting Rights Act precludes
preclearance under Section 5."); objection letter from Assistant Attorney General W.B. Reynolds to T.
Lewis, Chancery Clerk, Amite County, Miss. (June 6, 1983) ("[W]e believe that the proposed plan
... violates the substantive standard of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and, therefore, is not
entitled to preclearance under Section 5."); Pretrial Brief for the United States, County Council v.
United States, No. 82-0912, 73 n.* (D.D.C. filed Jan. 24, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Pretrial Brief]
(on file with Yale Law Journal). In the past, those construing § 5 have given special consideration to
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pretation is reinforced by an assessment of the impact of this change on
the Act as a whole.
B. Assessing the Statutory Scheme
An important alternative method of interpreting a new statute is to ex-
amine the effect of a given change on the coherence of the statutory
scheme.91 This section of the Note examines the impact of adopting a
results test for section 5 on the interrelation of the Act's key sections-2, 4
and 5.
Section 2 and section 5 provide different procedures for protecting mi-
nority voting rights.92  Notwithstanding the intrusiveness of the
preclearance procedure, the substantive standard under section 5 should
not be less strict than that of section 2. This is explicit in both the Senate
and House Reports.9" Yet, as illustrated in the earlier discussion of City of
Lockhart,9" the section 5 retrogression test currently makes lawful certain
voting practices that would be unlawful under the section 2 results test.
The use of different tests in sections 2 and 5 is thus at odds with the
conception of the Act expressed in the Senate and House reports, that the
individual provisions are but different procedures for enforcing the same
right. Futhermore, the standard used to test for violations is integral to the
meaning of the right, and the courts, as interpreters of rights, should be
reluctant to vary the meaning of a right between sections of an act.9 5
If the "purpose or effect" language of section 5 is broad enough to sug-
gest a results test for section 2, it is certainly sufficient to encompass a
the opinion of the Department of Justice. See United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131
(1977) ("[C]ontemporaneous administrative construction of the Act [by the Attorney General] is per-
suasive evidence of the original understanding...").
91. "In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sen-
tence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy." Unitcd States v. Heirs
of Boisdor6, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850), quoted in Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713
(1975); see also Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott and Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 631-32 (1973)
("It is well established that our task in interpreting separate provisions of a single Act is to give the
Act 'the most harmonious, comprehensive meaning possible' in light of the legislative policy and pur-
pose.") (citation omitted).
92. Section 2 allows citizens to challenge existing voting laws and practices; section 5 requires
covered jurisdictions to preclear changes in voting laws and practices.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 77 & 82.
94. See supra notes 29-33, 58-65 and accompanying text.
95. The meaning of "the right to vote" apart from any standard used to enforce it is ambiguous.
In defining the standard used to test for violations of a right, one defines the right itself. The right to
vote means equally apportioned districts; the right to vote means that minority groups may not be
denied "equal access to the political process" under the circumstances spelled out by the results test of
section 2. Cf. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 52 (1979) (arguing more
broadly that the right is defined by remedy used to enforce it); Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92
YALE L.J. 585, 592 (1983) ("[Rlemedial goals ... are limited by a definition of the right-that is,
what counts as a violation and as a legally relevant effect.") (emphasis added). Courts should be
particularly reluctant to vary the standard and hence the meaning of a right between sections of an act
designed to protect a fundamental right. See infra notes 123 & 124 and accompanying text.
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results test for section 5. In amending section 2 to make clear that an
effects test-the results test-was applicable, Congress based its action in
part on the language in section 5 mandating an effects test to enforce vot-
ing rights. Since the wording of section 5 clearly allows for an effects as
well as an intent test, Congress did not need to amend section 5 in order
to make the results test applicable to it.
The 1982 amendments to section 4 also suggest that Congress intended
the results test to apply to section 5. Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act97
lays out both the criteria that determine whether a state or political subdi-
vision is subject to the preclearance procedures of section 5, and the crite-
ria that determine when a jurisdiction can bail out of section 5 coverage.
The two sections are thus procedurally interdependent: One cannot work
without the other.98 But in addition to this procedural interdependence,
sections 4 and 5 are also substantively interdependent. As the Senate Re-
port states, "[The] bailout was carefully crafted to preserve the essential
protections of Section 5. The provisions work as an integrated comple-
mentary whole; removing any element would seriously undermine the en-
tire structure."99 The results test is needed in section 5 to ensure that
these two sections operate coherently and productively.
Section 4 was completely rewritten in 1982 to make bailout available
only after all voting discrimination is eliminated from a jurisdiction."' In
a suit to bail out of section 5 coverage, a jurisdiction has the burden of
proving that it has eliminated all "voting procedures and methods of elec-
tion which inhibit or dilute equal access to the electoral process."'' The
96. SENATE REPORT, supra note 42, at 18. The Senate Judiciary Committee argued that a re-
sults or effects test is legitimate under § 2:
It is true that [the statutory language of] Section 2 originally had no reference to a results or
effects standard, while Section 5 does. But as Senator Specter noted at the hearings, that argu-
ment proves nothing, inasmuch as Section 2 is also silent as to any intent standard, and Section
5 refers to proof of both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect.
Id. (footnote omitted).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1982).
98. The substantive link between these sections was first noted by Justice Harlan in Allen v. State
Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Harlan used the procedural linkage of § 5 and § 4 to determine the scope of voting changes properly
subject to preclearance under § 5: "[Section 5] is dearly designed to march in lock-step with § 4-the
two sections cannot be understood apart from one another." Id. at 584 (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Harlan's method remains valid, although his dissenting argu-
ment-that since § 4 dealt only with questions of access to the polls and not with vote dilution, the
scope of § 5 should also be drawn to exclude vote dilution-was rendered moot by the amendments to
§ 4 in 1982.
99. SENATE REPORT, supra note 42, at 44.
100. Id. at 54. See generally O'Rourke, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982: The New
Bailout Provision and Virginia, 69 VA. L. REv. 765, 772-91 (1983) (discussing history of bailout
and describing new provisions).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(F)(i) (1982). This includes a showing that, for the previous ten
years, it (1) has fully complied with the requirements of § 5, both to submit proposed changes on a
timely basis and to receive approval from the Attorney General for all changes; (2) has had no adverse
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Senate Report states unambiguously that the standard to be used to test
for the elimination of such vote dilution is the results test developed for
section 2,102 and that the burden of proof is on the jurisdiction seeking to
bail out.103
Given that Congress adopted the results test in section 4, the test should
also be employed in section 5. First, if courts were to continue to use a
retrogression test in section 5 suits, then courts deciding future section 4
suits would have to evaluate under the results test not only all of the
ongoing practices never reviewed under section 5, but also all of the
changes that had been precleared under the section 5 retrogression test.
Such review would be confusing as well as inefficient. When attempting
to prepare acceptable changes, jurisdictions would have to keep two stan-
dards in mind, one of which would not even be applicable until the juris-
diction was eligible to bring a bailout suit.
Second, by permitting jurisdictions to perpetuate vote dilution, the ret-
rogression test allows them to remain indefinitely in a status that will not
qualify them for bailout. Section 5 thus operates more as a bureaucratic
hoop through which jurisdictions must jump than as an extraordinary
remedy driving those jurisdictions most in need of positive voting changes
to eliminate vote dilution. Using a results test in section 5 would be more
consonant with the congressional objective of ensuring that jurisdictions
not be covered indefinitely by the preclearance provisions of the Act.10 4
judgments in voting rights litigation or entered into any consent decrees to abandon a challenged
voting practice; and (3) has taken positive steps to increase minority participation. SENATE REPORT,
supra note 42, at 46-53. The Senate Report elaborates on the nature of the positive steps expected:
Beyond the outright elimination of discriminatory barriers, the applicant jurisdiction must
make constructive efforts to eliminate the continued effects of many years of discrimination in
order to be relieved of special obligations under the Act. [It must eliminate all] discriminatory
structures [and make additional] constructive efforts to eliminate intimidation and harassment
... to enhance[ ] opportunity for registration ... [and to appoint] minority election officals
throughout the jurisdiction and at all stages of the political process.
Id. at 53-55.
102. The Report states:
In determining whether procedures or methods "inhibit or dilute equal access to the electoral
process," the standard to be used is the results test of White. In other words, the test would be
the same as that for a challenge brought under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended




104. See id. at 44. The Senate Judiciary Committee took great pains to emphasize that bailout
would be achievable. Congress recognized that the constitutionality of §§ 4 and 5 could well depend
on a clear showing that the extraordinary mechanism of preclearance would not be imposed perma-
nently on any state. To this end, Congress included a 25-year cap on § 5. But the main thrust of its
argument that no jurisdiction need fear permanent preclearance responsibility lay in the reasonable-
ness and achievability of the standard for bailout:
The Committee believes that the new bail-out provisions provide a balanced compromise
between protecting minority voting rights and eradicating the continuing effects of past dis-
crimination, on the one hand, and allowing jurisdictions with clear records to terminate Section
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Third, the legislative history of the amendments to section 4 further
supports the proposition that courts should apply the results test to section
5. Congress deliberately chose not to incorporate a results test into the
statutory language of section 4, and its reasons for doing so shed light on
why it did not alter the statutory language of section 5 to include the term
"results."
The Senate rejected an amendment proposed by Senator Stevens to in-
sert the term "results" into the statutory language of section 4,105 prefer-
ring to spell out in the Senate Report what test to use. 08 The decisive
argument against the Stevens amendment to section 4, made by both Sen-
ator Dole and Senator Kennedy, was that the Stevens amendment would
effectively reverse the burden of proof in bailout suits: Suits brought
under section 2 place the burden of proof on minority voters, while section
4 suits, like section 5 suits, place it on jurisdictions. 07 Congress may have
chosen not to insert the word "results" into sections 5 and 4 to forestall
any assertion that it had shifted the burden of proof from the jurisdiction
to minority voters.
For the Act to operate with full effectiveness, however, section 5 review
must include the results test. By failing to adopt a results test for section
5, courts would condemn voting rights litigants to needlessly duplicative
judicial review, and would slow the progress that covered jurisdictions
5 coverage, on the other. They offer a firm but fair and achievable set of standards for deter-
mining when a jurisdiction's preclearance obligations should end.
Id.
105. Senator Stevens argued that since the Senate Report made clear that the standard under § 4
was to be the results test, there was no need to introduce the new phrase "inhibit or dilute equal
access":
Now the standard for the bailout under this bill, according to the committee report, is in fact
to be the standard of section 2 .... The court is going to look at subsection 4(a)(1)(F)(i)
however, and say there is the language and it says "inhibit or dilute equal access." It is not
going to pay any attention to this report. . . . They [sic] are going to read the bill in plain
English language and find two standards; not one, two.
128 CoNG. REc. S6990 (daily ed. June 6, 1982) (statement of Sen. Stevens).
106. SENATE REPORT, supra note 42, at 54.
107. In Senator Dole's words, the amendment would "erroneously require a voter challenging
bailout to prove a White against Regester case in the middle of a covered jurisdiction's bailout suit.
• ..The proper burden of proving bailout is with the jurisdiction." 128 CONG. REc. 86993 (daily ed.
June 17, 1983) (statement of Sen. Dole). Similarly, Senator Kennedy stated:
Once a test is inscribed in terms of section 2, where the plaintiffs have the burden of proof,
and you place the identical language in section 5 [sic], where the jurisdiction has the burden of
proof, it is likely to be interpreted as shifting the burden of proof from the jurisdiction to the
individual on bailout. That is of considerable concern and we do not take it lightly.
Id. at S6995.
Senator Stevens' proposed amendment also provoked concern in the civil rights lobby that, because
the amendment removed the language "inhibit or dilute" from the bill, courts might conclude that
Congress intended the Voting Rights Act to cover only problems of denial of access to the polls and
not vote dilution. See Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Factsheet on Stevens' Amendments
(Modifying Bailout Provision) (June 16, 1982), reprinted in 128 CONG. REC. S6997 (daily ed. June
17, 1982).
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would otherwise make toward eliminating racial vote dilution. The legis-
lative history does not support the view, however, that Congress intended
the courts and the Department of Justice entirely to abandon the retro-
gression test. The retrogression test will still be useful in certain cases.
Because it does not require the same fact gathering as does the results test,
the retrogression test is a convenient basis for denying preclearance to ob-
viously retrogressive changes. Yet the practical and substantive limits of
the retrogression test reveal the need for an alternative test in section 5.
C. The Results Test: Who Bears the Burden of Proof.
If the section 2 results test is applied to section 5, then courts will need
to decide which party should bear the burden of showing a results viola-
tion in a section 5 suit. The Department of Justice has argued that the
jurisdiction seeking preclearance should not have the burden of proving, as
it ordinarily would under section 5, that the proposed changes do not vio-
late the results standard. 08 Instead, according to the Department of Jus-
tice, the burden initially should be on the United States to show a results
violation, and should "shift[ ] to the plaintiffs ...only after a prima
facie case has been made.""'
The justification for this interpretation lies both in the absence of an
explicit statement by Congress that the burden of proof should be on the
jurisdiction"" and in the Senate Report's reference to a violation of "sec-
tion 2" rather than "the results test.""' The Department of Justice inter-
prets the Senate Report to mean that within the ongoing process of section
5 review there should be embedded a mini-section 2 suit: If the Senate
had meant otherwise, it would have said "results test" and not "section
2
Courts should not adopt this interpretation. Removing the burden of
proof from the jurisdiction is not mandated by the legislative history of the
1982 amendments, and would run counter to the need for" 2 and structure
108. Pretrial Brief, supra note 90, at 74; see Blumstein, supra note 42, at 684 n. 254 (minority
voters should have burden of proof if results test is applied to § 5).
109. Pretrial Brief, supra note 90, at 74.
110. Id. (1982 amendments "did not assign to covered jurisdictions an additional burden of proof
to be met in order to obtain preclearance").
111. SENATE REPORT, supra note 42, at 12 n.31 ("In light of the amendment to section 2, it is
intended that a section 5 objection also follow if a new voting procedure itself so discriminates as to
violate section 2.").
112. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 n.21 (1969) ("Of course the private
litigant could always bring suit under the Fifteenth Amendment [when a jurisdiction has failed to
submit a change for preclearance]. But it was the inadequacy of just these suits for securing the right
to vote that prompted Congress to pass the Voting Rights Act."); Keady & Cochran, Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act: A Time for Revision, 69 Ky. L.J. 741, 774-76 (1980-81) (immense number of § 5
submissions precludes Attorney General from providing adequate review).
If one placed the burden of proof in § 5 on the Department of Justice and minority voters, then the
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of preclearance.11 Neither the private litigants nor the Attorney General
has the resources to shoulder this burden, and the preclearance mecha-
nism reflects Congress' considered decision "to shift the advantage of time
and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims."1 14 Moreover,
the precedential value of section 5 preclearance in a subsequent bailout
suit under section 4 would be lost if the burden of proof in preclearance
review were placed on the United States, since in section 4 bailout suits
the burden would be on the jurisdiction. That a jurisdiction's voting
changes had been precleared would not carry any weight in the bailout
proceeding. In contrast, if the burden were on the jurisdiction in the
preclearance phase, and if the jurisdiction carried this burden, it would
establish the legitimacy of the cleared change in a bailout suit under sec-
tion 4 as well. Given the basic purposes both of the Act as a whole and of
section 5 in particular, the burden of proof in section 5 suits should lie on
the jurisdiction to show no discriminatory results.
III. THE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Although an examination of the legislative history and the statutory
scheme alone strongly suggests that the standard for section 5 review has
changed, it is also worth looking at the significance of this change in a
broader context. The new standard appears to be a positive step toward
incorporation of a results test into § 5 would add very little to the protection of minority voters; these
voters could always bring a § 2 suit against a covered jurisdiction once the precleared change had been
implemented. This was Senator Dole's point in arguing against a proposal to remove the burden of
proof from jurisdictions under § 4. ("It is not the voter's burden to prove a section 2 case under the
bailout, if [sic] that were so, then the entire provision is unnecessary because a voter can always bring
a section 2 case if that voter can hire a lawyer to prove the complex and difficult issues involved in
section 2.") 128 CONG. REC. S6993 (daily ed. June 17, 1983) (statement of Sen. Dole).
113. The structure of preclearance review counsels against placing the burden of proof on the
Department of Justice, because the Department acts primarily as a judge and not as a litigant. It has
independent authority to preclear proposed voting changes, receives numerous submissions each year,
and is dependent on the information provided by the submitting jurisdiction to make its judgment.
Minority voters are a part of this process in a formal sense, in that the Department of Justice repre-
sents them, and they cannot appeal a decision to preclear a change. In practice, however, they are
denied the opportunity to shoulder the burden of proof; the Department of Justice typically relies on
information submitted by the jurisdiction to determine whether the jurisdiction has met the burden of
proof. If the burden of proof were placed on the Department of Justice, the Department would be in
the awkward position of relying on the jurisdiction to proffer the information necessary for the De-
partment to carry its burden. The long-run impact of such a burden shift thus ultimately could be
deleterious to the very interests that Congress intended § 2 and § 5 to protect-those of minority
voters. Currently, a change precleared by the Attorney General can still be challenged by minority
voters under § 2. See Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 328 (E.D. La. 1983). If § 5 preclearance
included a results review, then this recourse might no longer be available. And if that review took
place in an office in the Department of Justice and not in the courtroom, with no direct participation
by minority voters, then it is not clear whether the new standard would afford minority voters much
additional protection. By keeping the burden of proof on the jurisdiction, courts would maintain the
existing distinction between § 2 and § 5 actions, and ensure that racial minority voters continued to
have two stages of protection against vote dilution.
114. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966).
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fulfilling the Act's original goals and the promise of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments.
A. Original Purpose
In upholding the constitutionality of section 5 in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach,"5 the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he Voting Rights Act
was designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in
voting, which has infected the electoral process in parts of our country for
nearly a century." ' The retrogression test, however, would indicate that
the purpose of section 5 is simply to preserve existing levels of minority
voting strength 11 7 This view is fundamentally mistaken. In Katzenbach,
the Court made clear its understanding that the Voting Rights Act was
designed not merely to freeze voting discrimination at existing levels, but
to "rid the country of racial discrimination in voting."11 8 Congress has
reaffirmed this interpretation. 19
The retrogression test is inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of
the Voting Rights Act and of section 5; it does not demand progress from
the covered jurisdictions, but asks only that jurisdictions not make condi-
tions worse. One can argue that "not making things worse" is progress,"O
but that does not appear to be the kind of progress Congress had in mind.
Congress knew that states "had resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of
contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating
voting discrimination;"'' preclearance was needed to ensure that such a
stratagem would not succeed. Although plans that perpetuate or do not
fully remedy vote dilution will generally fail the results test,' 22 they will
115. Id.
116. Id. at 308, cited with approval in McCain v. Lybrand, 104 S. Ct. 1037, 1043 (1984).
117. See, e.g., McMillan v. Escambia County, 559 F. Supp. 720, 729 (N.D. Fla. 1983) (section 5
designed to "preserve the status quo"), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 1577
(1984).
118. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315.
119. In 1970, 1975, and 1982 Congress extended the Voting Rights Act for limited time periods
in order to complete the job of eliminating vote dilution. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 19, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 774, 785; SENATE REPORT, supra note
42, at 9-15; H.R. REP. No. 227, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. 43 (1981); cf. United States v. Board of
Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 134 (1978) ("When a Congress that re-enacts a statute voices its approval of
an administrative or other interpretation thereof, Congress is treated as having adopted that interpre-
tation, and this Court is bound thereby.") (citations omitted).
120. See supra note 26.
121. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 335; see also id. at 316 ("Section 5 prescribes a
second remedy, the suspension of all new voting regulations pending review by federal authorities to
determine whether their use would perpetuate voting discrimination."); City of Lockhart v. United
States, 460 U.S. 125, 138-42 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (legislative history shows purpose of §
5 to prevent perpetuation of vote dilution); 128 CONG. REc. S6942 (daily ed. June 17, 1982) (state-
ment of Sen. Mathias) (purpose as recognized in South Carolina v. Katzenbach still accurate inter-
pretation of congressional intent).
122. See discussion of Lockhart, supra notes 29-33, 58-65 and accompanying text; see also Beer
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often pass the retrogression test. The Court's retrogression test is thus
equivalent to those "extraordinary stratagems" that Congress feared states
would employ to perpetuate vote dilution.
B. Equal Protection
If we view the right to an undiluted vote not simply as a statutory right,
but as a fundamental right of constitutional stature,123 then the retrogres-
sion test is inadequate-it does not provide to minority voters in different
jurisdictions the equal protection of their voting rights. The right to vote,
understood as the right to cast a ballot, is in constitutional terms a funda-
mental right.12' But the case law is ambiguous about the degree of protec-
tion the Constitution affords against racial vote dilution. 25 In City of Mo-
bile v. Bolden, Justice Stewart rejected the claim that the right to vote
protected by the Fifteenth Amendment included a right of minorities to be
free from unintentional racial vote dilution.1 26 His argument persuaded
only a plurality of the Court, however,127 and is inconsistent both with a
straightforward reading of the text of the Fifteenth Amendment1 2' and
v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 143-44 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (facts found by district court,
including racial bloc voting, segregated residential patterns, and majority and anti-single-shot voting
requirements, suggest that proposed changes would not "afford the Negro minority the opportunity to
achieve legislative representation roughly proportional to the Negro population in the community").
123. The Voting Rights Act "is designed primarily to enforce the 15th amendment .... " H.R.
REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2437,
2437.
124. Although the Constitution does not specifically confer a right to vote, it certainly presupposes
such a right. The right to vote is protected by the Fifteenth Amendment, and is essential to the
meaning and functioning of representative government: The right to vote is fundamental because it is
"preservative of all rights," Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); accord Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (right to vote "preservative of. . . basic civil and political rights"). One
might also argue that the right to vote is inherent in the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
political speech, for the ballot is the ultimate tangible manifestation of political expression. It is not
surprising that state legislation which infringed upon the right to vote was among the first to receive
strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (claim of vote dilution presents "a justiciable constitutional cause of action," and
"right asserted is within the reach of judicial protection under the Fourteenth Amendment"); Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) ("[T]he right to vote is too precious, too
fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned.").
125. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HArv. L. REv. 75, 143 n.42 (1980) (consti-
tutional theory in vote dilution decisions ambiguous; can be read as involving fundamental rights or
suspect classification analysis). But see City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 120 (1980) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("Our vote-dilution decisions, then, involve the fundamental-interest branch, rather
than the antidiscrimination branch, of our jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause.").
126. 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (plurality opinion) (Fifteenth Amendment bars only purposeful
abridgement of right to vote). Justice Stewart's rejection seems to have been based more on skepticism
about the judicial manageability of identifying voting rights violations than on a reading of the Consti-
tution or case law. See id. at 78-79 n.26.
127. Only Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined the opinion. Id. at 55.
128. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S.
CONsT. amend. XV, § 1. The Fifteenth Amendment phrase "denied or abridged" is most naturally
read to encompass problems of access and dilution. See Hartman, supra note 22, at 706; cf Beer v.
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with the reasoning of other opinions of the Court explaining why voting is
a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Reynolds v.
Sims, 29 for example, the Court stated that "the right of suffrage is a fun-
damental matter in a free and democratic society,"130 and that "the right
of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a
citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise
of the franchise." 131 The core principle of Reynolds that all votes must
carry an equal weight is as applicable to minority voters today as to the
urban plaintiffs who originally brought that suit.132
The retrogression test is inappropriate as the sole test for a fundamen-
tal right since the structure of the test inevitably denies minority voters in
some districts the equal protection of the laws. Because the test employs a
relative standard, a district in which black voting strength is represented
more fairly to begin with will receive greater protection than one in which
black voting strength is less fairly represented. 3 The test thus leaves
United States, 425 U.S. 130, 153 n.l 1 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I read 'abridge' in both § 5
and the Fifteenth Amendment as primarily involving an absolute assessment of dilution of Negro
voting power from its potential. . . ."); Wilkes County v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1171, 1178
(D.D.C.) ("The use of at-large elections in Wilkes County has the effect of abridging the right to vote
of blacks on account of race or color by diluting and reducing the influence of blacks in elec-
tions. . . .) (emphasis added), affd mem., 439 U.S. 999 (1978).
129. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (constitutional principle of one person, one vote protects urban voters
from districting schemes (malapportionment) that render votes of sparsely-populated rural areas more
influential than their own).
130. Id. at 561-62.
131. Id. at 555; cf. J.S. MILL, supra note 22, at 142 ('[T]here is not equal suffrage where every
single individual does not count for as much as any other single individual in the community.").
132. While the bold rhetoric in Reynolds can be read to encompass all aspects of vote dilution, the
remedy flowing from Reynolds dealt simply with malapportionment, and not specifically with racial
vote dilution. See Note, The Constitutional Imperative of Proportional Representation, 94 YALE L.J.
163 (1984) (distinguishing malapportionment and equally weighted vote from racial vote dilution and
equally meaningful vote). But mathematically equal apportionment may still under- or over-represent
voters. R. DIxoN, DEMocRATIc REPRESENTATION 18 (1968). Thus the Reynolds formula for mathe-
matically equal votes addresses only part of the problem of vote dilution. Yet the logic of Reynolds
offers no reason for limiting the remedy only to malapportionment. Indeed, the Court in Reynolds
drew support for its holding from cases involving racial vote denial and dilution. 377 U.S. at 563
(citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960) and Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275
(1939)). When the under-represented voters are racial minorities, the problem of diluted votes takes
on added constitutional significance. See SFNATE REPORT, supra note 42, at 19-27 ("basic vote dilu-
tion principle" of Reynolds applies to racial vote dilution; City of Mobile departed from this principle);
Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 42; cf. Hartman, supra note 22, at 708-10 (criticizing Justice
Stewart's opinion in City of Mobile for failing to advance principled distinction between numerical
malapportionment and racial vote dilution while making discriminatory motivation touchstone only of
latter).
133. For example, assume that cities A and B both have council governments composed of repre-
sentatives from five single-member districts, that both have 60% white and 40% black voting-age
populations, and that both have a history of racial discrimination and persistent racial bloc voting.
Minority voters in A and B are similarly situated in all respects except in their ability to elect repre-
sentatives of their choice. In A, district lines are drawn to fairly reflect minority voting strength-two
out of five districts are black majority districts; in B, the lines are drawn so there are no black major-
ity districts. If A submits a redistricting plan that reduces the number of its black majority districts
from two to one, this plan will not pass the retrogression test; it will have a clearly retrogressive effect
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worst off those voters who were in the worst position to start with."" This
variation in the protection of voting rights across jurisdictions cannot
withstand the strict scrutiny that courts should apply in cases involving an
infringement of a fundamental right.
1 3 5
The retrogression test smacks of the logic that two wrongs make a
right: It allows abridgement of a fundamental right simply because the
abridgement created by the new law is no worse than the abridgement
which previously existed. 3 6 Such variations in protection would be less
likely to occur if the results test were used. As both an absolute test and
one that is tailored to fit local circumstances, the results test eliminates the
built-in bias of the retrogression test in favor of jurisdictions with the most
severe racial vote dilution.
CONCLUSION
Courts should respond to the legislative history of the 1982 Voting
Rights Act Amendments by adopting the results test for section 5, and by
keeping the burden on jurisdictions to prove that proposed changes do not
result in vote dilution. While courts need not abandon the retrogression
test entirely, they should no longer use it to preclear changes that would
violate the results test of sections 2 and 4. Instead, they should use the
retrogression test as a threshold test, denying preclearance to those
changes with an obviously retrogressive impact and approving only those
changes that pass both the retrogression and results tests. This approach
to section 5 will ensure that the various sections of the Act operate to-
on the ability of blacks in A to elect representatives of their choices. But if B submits a proposal that
increases the number of black majority districts from zero to one, this plan will pass the test and be
precleared. While such a plan improves representation for minority voters in B, it plainly fails to
eliminate minority vote dilution. B's minority voters must put up with vote dilution not tolerated in
A, simply because the new degree of dilution in B is no worse than what had previously existed. The
retrogression test does not impose an affirmative duty to eliminate all vote dilution, and does not
provide the protection properly accorded a fundamental right.
134. Binion, The hinplemnentation of Section 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act: A Retrospective on
the Role of Courts, 32 W. POL. Q. 154, 171 (1979) (Supreme Court's interpretation of § 5 in Beer
"reward[s] those jurisdictions with a history of the worst dilution of black electoral strength"); Eng-
strom, Racial Vote Dilution: Supreme Court Interpretations of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 4
S.U.L. REv. 139, 162 (1978).
135. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) ("[A]ny alleged infringement of the right of
citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.").
136. The Court rejected this "two wrongs make a right" logic in an analogous situation involving
school desegregation. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38, 441 (1968) (county that
replaced de jure school segregation with "free choice" plan that perpetuated segregation did not meet
its obligation to eliminate discrimination "root and branch").
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gether efficiently and coherently, and will return section 5 to its proper
role as an agent for the elimination rather than the perpetuation of racial
vote dilution.
-Mark E. Haddad
